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FAMILY CHANGE AND WELFARE REFORM
Jane Mauldon*
I. INTRODUCTION
The accelerating growth of single-parent families poses
special challenges for policymakers in the United States.
Since the Colonial Period, the support and rearing of children
has been defined as the almost exclusive prerogative and obli-
gation of parents. The state has played a very circumscribed
role vis-d-vis families, chiefly as a monitor of children's well-
being. The flip side of parental autonomy is an expectation of
self-sufficiency. Public education constitutes the only major
exception to the overall dearth of public resources available to
most children. Otherwise, the state provides very limited
material and other help to most families with children.
There are, for example, no child allowances in the United
States, no mandatory paid maternity leave, no universal
health programs for children, little publicly provided child
care, and so forth.
Consistent with this country's reluctance to assist fami-
lies directly, most public discussion about "the family" has fo-
cused on policies to influence adult behavior towards children
rather than on strategies to provide material support for chil-
dren. In the current Congress, efforts to tie assistance to "ap-
propriate" or "moral" parental behavior are reaching levels
unprecedented in national policy. Politicians are proposing
to deny assistance to children conceived while the mother is
on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and to
children conceived by unwed mothers who are under the age
of eighteen. Other proposals seek to cut or deny aid for fami-
lies if the mother does not comply with program work re-
quirements, if she provides any false information on her ap-
plication for aid, or if she does not cooperate with official
efforts to collect child support from the child's father. Some
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states are reducing a family's public subsidy grant if the chil-
dren do not attend school since this is behavior that is ex-
pected to be under the parents' control. Other states cut a
teen parent's AFDC grant if she does not attend school.
Under all of these initiatives, public assistance to a family is
tied to parental behavior and not solely to children's need.
Two demographic trends have fueled these policy propos-
als: (1) increases in the number of unmarried women giving
birth; and (2) the accompanying rise in the number of fathers
who appear to have abandoned their children. In this paper,
we describe these demographic changes in some detail and
place them in context. We review some of the reasons for the
trends and assess how likely they are to be slowed or re-
versed. We outline some likely consequences of proposals to
"reform" AFDC, and conclude with a review of other policy
strategies to assist families with children. Because adult be-
havior towards children, rather than the lives of children
themselves, is the center of policy interest and the object of
policy concern, the presented data focuses on adult living ar-
rangements and behavior.
II. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE
In the United States in 1993, there were 9.3 million fe-
male-headed families with minor children, of which nearly
four in every ten (3.4 million families) were headed by a wo-
man who had never been married.1 The median income of a
female-headed family was $13,445, far below that of married
couples. About half of these families were below the official
poverty threshold, causing many to depend on public assist-
ance.2 This data shows the hardships experienced by many
children in single-parent families, and provides a clear ra-
tionale for the current levels of policy concern.
A. The Rise in Unwed Childbearing
The proportion of births out-of-wedlock has risen quite
sharply in the past two decades, from 11% in 1970 to nearly
1. STEVE W. RAWLINGS, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REPORT P20-477, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTEmSTICS: MARCH 1993,
at 92 tbl. 10 (1994) [hereinafter RAWLINGS 1993].
2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1994, at 471 tbl. 718, 479 tbl. 736 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
326 [Vol. 36
1996] SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 327
30% in 1992. 3 The large majority (69%) of births to teenagers
are outside marriage, while four out of ten births to women
aged twenty to twenty-four and 17% of births to older women
are also out-of-wedlock. 4
The increase in nonmarital births can be linked directly
to the growing number of young women who are unmarried.
In 1990, nearly two-thirds (63%) of women aged twenty to
twenty-four had never married, whereas in 1970, only 28%
had never married. Currently, both men and women have
the highest median ages at first marriage ever recorded, 23.9
and 26.9, respectively (the data goes back to 1890).5 Since
1970, the median ages at first marriage have increased a full
three years for both men and women.6
These changes have lengthened the years of singlehood
for sexually mature young women and men by nearly fifty
percent. Young women now have more years in which to get
pregnant while still single. The early twenties have gener-
ally been a time of life characterized by high rates of
childbearing. Since the period of unmarried sexual activity
has been lengthened, there has been a modest decline in the
ages at which young people become sexually active. While
sexually active teenagers today are more likely to use birth
control, 7 the increases in contraceptive use have not kept
pace with the increased numbers of unmarried people who
are having sex. Thus, we find a sharp rise in nonmarital
pregnancies.
If women do become pregnant, their options are broader
than in the past. About half of nonmarital conceptions are
now aborted, an option not readily available to most women
before 1973. Unmarried motherhood is also more socially
and economically feasible than in the past. Marriages to
legitimize a conception, "shotgun marriages," are becoming a
3. Id. at 80 tbl. 100.
4. See generally id. Among women older than 25 the fraction of births that
are nonmarital hovers around 17% for all age groups. Id.
5. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P23-181,
HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES AND CHILDREN: A 30-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 6 fig. 2 (1992)
[hereinafter A 30-YEAR PERSPECTIVE].
6. Id.
7. See generally ALAN GuTTMACHER INSTITUTE, SEX AND AMERICAS TEEN-
AGERS (1994); Jane Mauldon & Kristin Luker, Contraception Among America's
Teens: The News Is Better than You Think (1995) (on file with the Berkeley
Institute for Research on Policy Solutions, Working Paper PS10, Graduate
School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley).
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thing of the past. As recently as the 1960's, more than half(fifty-three percent) of women who conceived a child
premaritally, a rarer event than now, were married before
the birth of the child. Even sex between unmarried people
was described as though the couple would later marry since it
was known as "premarital sex." By the 1985-1989 period,
only one-fourth (twenty-seven percent) of premarital concep-
tions were legitimated through marriage.'
Table 1 summarizes birth and marriage data since 1970
for women aged fifteen to thirty-five, accounting for 90% of all
births. The table shows the number of births attributed to
unmarried women for the age-group twenty to twenty-four
increasing from 10% of births in 1970 to 41% in 1992. The
table also shows two trends that have led to a higher percent-
age of births occurring outside marriage. The trends are,
first, the rising number of women who are unmarried, now
standing at 68% of women aged twenty to twenty-four, and,
second, their rising propensity to give birth when unmarried.
For comparison, the table also shows the fertility rate in each
age-group for all women, married and unmarried.
While the fertility rates of unmarried women have been
rising steadily, the overall fertility rates, independent of mar-
ital status, fell in most age-groups between 1970 and 1980.
Since 1980, they have held steady for women in their twen-
ties while rising for teens and women in their thirties. The
increase in births among teens is a result of the increasing
number of teens who are sexually active. The increase for
older women largely represents delayed childbearing rather
than a return to larger families. The final row of Table 1
shows the fraction of nonmarital births to women in the dif-
ferent age groups. 9 Contrary to the stereotype, teenage
births are a minority, consisting of twenty-nine percent of all
nonmarital births. Teenage births are important for several
reasons. First, they represent the onset of childbearing. Sec-
ond, they may sometimes disrupt other important transitions
into adulthood such as schooling or employment. Third, wo-
men later regret having had their first child young, and some
teens would become better equipped to be parents if they
8. A 30-YEAR PERSPECTIVE, supra note 5, at 10 fig. 6.
9. Women between 15 and 34 represent 94% of nonmarital births and 90%
of all births, so if we had included the full age-range 15-45 the results would not
differ much from those shown. See id. at 11 fig. 7.
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TABLE 1
BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED AND MARRIED WOMEN,
BY AGE-GROUP: 1970-1990
AGE OF WOMAN:
Percent of Births that were to Married
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88% 45% 24% 20%
93% 58% 33% 23%













1992 29% 36% 19% 10%
delayed childbearing. However, -numerically, women aged
twenty to twenty-four have the largest share of nonmarital
births, accounting for some forty percent of the total. Overall,
about two-thirds of all nonmarital births are to women under
twenty-five.
These tables present data on two aspects of the current
transformation of American families: marriage and
childbearing. A third important aspect is the acceleration of
the divorce rate during the 1960's and 1970's, to a point
where about half of all marriages now end in divorce. The
consequence of these changes is that large numbers of women
are now raising children alone, while large numbers of men
are neither living with nor supporting their offspring.
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B. Fewer Men Living with Children
Table 2 represents these trends since 1973 in terms of
the living arrangements of men and women in the prime chil-
drearing years, between eighteen and forty-five. 10
TABLE 2






Unmarried and childless (family-free)
Total



















Percent of men living with children 52% 42% 40%
Median age 28 29 32
10. See generally RAWLINGS 1993, supra note 1; STEVE W. RAWLINGS, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-388, HOUSEHOLD
AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1983 (1984) [hereinafter RAWLINGS
1983]; ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS P20-478, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1993
(1994); ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS P20-389, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1983
(1984); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-258,
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1973 (1974) [hereinafter
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 1973]; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-255, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGE-
MENTS: MARCH 1973 (1974). The data describe only the civilian noninstitu-
tional population, and thus exclude people in prison or in the military. The
data slightly understate the prevalence of unmarried parents living with their
children, in that unmarried couples had to select one person to be identified as
the household head and parent of the child(ren), and the other parent's rela-
tionship to the children went unrecorded. These two-parent families show up in
the data as one-parent families and the second parents show up as living
neither with spouse nor with children. Fortunately, from other studies we
know the number of these families is small. See Larry L. Bumpass & R. Kelly
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In 1973, a majority of both men and women in this age-
group were married with children. That proportion has since
fallen fourteen percentage points, or by about one-fourth.
Now, more young and middle-aged adults are unmarried and
childless than are married with children. The proportion of
adults aged eighteen to forty-five who are living apart from
parents, children, and spouses, and generally apart from all
family members, has doubled in the past twenty years.'1
This data clearly shows men's "flight from the family."
Not only are six of every ten young and middle-aged men not
routinely involved in childrearing, but most of these men are
not married. When the 2% of men living on military bases
and the 1.5% of men confined to prison are included in the
analysis, it is clear that a majority of men aged eighteen to
forty-five are not living in families of their own. This means
that they do not live with a spouse or child of their own, a
status that we will term hereinafter "family-free." Nearly
half (45%) of these family-free young adults, both men and
women, are living in their parents' homes, while the rest ap-
pear to be living entirely outside families.
Although the overall trends are similar in all groups, the
changes in the family have occurred at different rates among
different racial and ethnic groups. 12 A majority of men, re-
Raley, Redefining Single-Parent Families: Cohabitation and Changing Family
Reality, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 97, 97-109 (1995).
11. These changes would be even greater except that the median age of this
population has risen as the baby boom cohort has aged: the median age of 18 to
45 year-olds was 28 in 1973, 29 in 1983 and 32 in 1993. See RAWLINGS 1993,
supra note 5; RAWLINGS 1983, supra note 10; HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARAC-
TERISTICS 1973, supra note 10.
12. TALE 3
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF ADULTS OF CHILDBEARING AGE, 1993:
By RAcE/ETHmNcrry AND BY AGE
AGE 18-45, AGE 18-45
WrrE NON- AFRICAN- AGE 18-45, AGE 18-45, AGE 18-24,
ISPANIC AMERIcAN HIsPANmc ALL RACES ALL RACES
WOMEN
Married with children 44% 23% 44% 41% 13%
Single parent 12% 39% 20% 15% 13%
Married, no children 15% 6% 10% 13% 10%
Unmarried and childless
(family-free) 29% 32% 26% 30% 64%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Percent of women living
unmarried, childless and
apart from parents 16% 14% 13% 15% 21%
Percent of women living
with children 56% 62% 64% 57% 26%
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gardless of ethnicity, are not living with children. This pro-
portion ranges from 58% of whites to 72% of African-Ameri-
cans. The proportion of men who are family-free ranges from
46% of whites to 65% of African-Americans. While female
headship and unmarried childbearing are most likely to occur
among black women, the majority of nonmarital births and
female-headed households are white.' 3
Increasingly, men and women are going through dramat-
ically different experiences as they mature into young adults.
Among the youngest adults, aged eighteen to twenty-four,
more than a quarter (26%) of the women are living with and
raising their own children, while only 8% of men are. Men
never seem to catch up to women. In the entire eighteen to
forty-five age-group, more than half (57%) of women are rais-
ing their own children, and more than one-fourth of them
(25%) are doing so alone. In contrast, only 40% of men in this
age-group are raising their own children, and only 2% are do-
ing so alone. 14 Men are now 40% more likely than women to
not have children or to be living apart from them. They are
70% more likely to be entirely family free.
The gender gap in childrearing is most marked among
African-Americans. Only 28% of black men are living with
their children on a full-time basis, while nearly two-thirds
(62%) of black women are. Again, the experiences of the
MEN
Married with children 39% 25% 38% 37% 7%
Single parent 2% 3% 3% 2% 1%
Married, no children 13% 7% 9% 13% 6%
Umarried and childless
(family-free) 46% 65% 51% 47% 86%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Percent of men living
unmarried, childless and
apart from parents 24% 32% 29% 25% 26%
Percent of men living with
children 42% 28% 40% 40% 8%
13. In 1993, there were 5.9 million one-parent families with children main-
tained by white women, 3.1 million maintained by African-American women
and 1.3 million headed by Latinas. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 62
tbl. 72. In 1992, there were 467,500 births to unmarried white women, 449,000
to unmarried black women, and 251,500 to unmarried Latina women. These
births constituted 19% of births to white women, 39% of births to Latinas, and
68% of births to African-American women.
14. It is not possible to establish from these data what fraction of the men
who are not with children of their own actually have biological offspring, but
certainly a substantial fraction of them do; the children of single mothers obvi-
ously have fathers somewhere.
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youngest adults are the most divergent. Thirty-seven percent
of black women aged eighteen to twenty-four are raising chil-
dren, whereas only 5% of black men are living with their own
children.
This large gender gap is directly related to the lower
marriage rates among African-Americans. The majority of
black women with children are not currently married. To the
extent that African-American men cohabit with their chil-
dren's mother in her home instead of marry, these tables will
exaggerate black men's absence from their children's lives.
Intermittent cohabitation, as well as other types of involve-
ment in children's lives, such as frequent visiting, cannot
show up in our data either. Some ethnographic data15 sug-
gests that these behaviors are quite common in low-income
African-American families, in which case these tables over-
state the gender gap.
A sharp disjuncture now exists between the childrearing
experiences of men and women, and it is greatest among the
youngest adults, those under age twenty-five. This gendered
disjuncture has always existed because family responsibili-
ties have been split along gender lines, and childrearing re-
sponsibilities have fallen, at least since the Colonial Period,
almost entirely to women in both one- and two-parent fami-
lies. However, men who live apart from their children are, for
the most part, absent from childrearing to a much greater ex-
tent than the prototypical "fifties father" who brought home
the family paycheck but was emotionally distant from his
children.
C. Why the Decline in Marriage?
These rapid demographic changes pose complex and diffi-
cult challenges for policymakers. One response is to cast
about for ways to slow or reverse the trends towards one-
parent families. A favorite scapegoat is the availability of
AFDC. However, as we will see, the evidence supporting this
theory is weak at best. The changes in family structure, spe-
cifically the decline in marriage among young adults and the
growth of nonmarital childbearing, result from a number of
intersecting forces in which AFDC is only a bit player.
15. See CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY (1974).
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One set of forces is the opportunities facing young adults
in terms of education, employment, and wages. The more ad-
vantaged and talented young adults are delaying marriage in
favor of education, as they attend college or postgraduate
training in increasing numbers. 16 Marriage has traditionally
followed, rather than preceded or accompanied, schooling.
An even greater barrier to marriage may be unemploy-
ment, especially male unemployment. Among young people
who do not go to college, unemployment is chronic and severe.
In 1992, 20% of the young people not enrolled in school were
not in the labor force either, and 13% of those who were in the
labor force were unemployed. In sum, 30% of young adults
not in school were also not working. And what fraction of
those aged sixteen to twenty-four fit the classic profile of a
marriage prospect? The fraction in 1980 was 40%. By 1992,
this fraction had dropped to 34%. For whites, the decrease
was from 42% to 36%, and for African-Americans, from 30%
to 26%.17
These low employment rates and accompanying low
wages translate into incomes that are completely inadequate
to support a family. By the late 1980's, one in two white men
(52%), three in four African-American men (76%), and two in
three Latino men (60%) aged twenty to twenty-four had earn-
ings below the poverty level for a family of three.1 8 Even for
men in their late twenties and early thirties, the proportions
were nearly one-quarter of white men (24%), more than one-
third of black men (37%), and just under one-half of Hispanic
men (40%) aged twenty-five to thirty-four with earnings be-
low poverty.19 These proportions were all much higher than
a decade earlier, by some ten to thirty percentage points.
The problem of intolerably low earnings is the most se-
vere for young men whose education stops at high school
graduation or before. The average earnings of a male high
16. In 1980, among young adults aged 16 to 24, 21% were in college, 22%
were in some other schooling (including high school), and 57% were not enrolled
in school. In 1992, 28% of this age-group were in college, 24% in other school-
ing, and 49% were not enrolled in school. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 2, at 400 tbl. 623.
17. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 400 tbl. 623.
18. See WILLIAM T. GRANT FOUNDATION, THE FORGOTTEN HALF: PATHWAYS
TO SUCCESS FOR AMERICA'S YOUTH AND YOUNG FAMILIES (1988).
19. Suzanne M. Bianchi, Children of Poverty: Why Are They Poor?, in
CHILD POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 91, 91-125 (Judith A. Chafel ed., 1993).
[Vol. 36334
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school dropout fell by more than forty percent between 1973
and 1986, and the earnings of a male high school graduate
fell by nearly one-third.2 0 Not surprisingly, the least edu-
cated young men and women have the lowest marriage rates,
the young women have the fewest reasons to delay childbear-
ing, and consequently these parents have the highest rates of
nonmarital childbearing.
A second set of forces discouraging marriage has to do
with changing attitudes. Today's high labor force participa-
tion rates for married women have dramatically changed
family life and the very character of marriage in the United
States.21 Although young men, especially those who are less-
educated, now have less to offer economically than in the
past, one might argue that young women can contribute more
financially to the marriage today. Thus, the relationship
should be able to go forward anyway. Single and married
mothers now have very similar probabilities of working. In
1990, 72% of married mothers living with children under
eighteen were employed, compared to 70% of single
mothers.22
An egalitarian type of marriage seems more available to
young people than in the past, even if the traditional "man as
breadwinner" model is precluded by the high unemployment
and low wages facing young men. However, an egalitarian
marriage is probably easiest to sustain if no children are
present at the outset. Moreover, a large body of evidence in-
dicates that in most marriages, "egalitarian" more often char-
acterizes the income flow into the home than the spouses'
contributions to the work within the home. Even men whose
wives are employed full-time rarely participate equally with
their wives in the work of the home.
The data suggests that young women are assessing their
potential marriage partners, and are finding themselves dis-
appointed. They may not want an egalitarian marriage, it
may not be offered to them, and the men around them may
not have much to offer materially. Young women are also,
however, finding themselves not ready for marriage and find-
20. See WILLIAM T. GRANT FOUNDATION, supra note 18.
21. See JAMEs A. SWEET & LARRY L. BuMPASS, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND
HOUSEHOLDS (1987).
22. See A 30-YEAR PERSPECTWvE, supra note 5, at 40 fig. 33.
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ing the institution of marriage itself a risky proposition.23
They know that a majority of young marriages end in divorce.
They have often had personal experience as children with
their parents' divorce or separation, and they may wish to
protect themselves and their child from the trauma of what
they see as an inevitable separation.
The polarized childrearing experiences of young adults,
especially of young African-Americans, can only contribute to
a lack of understanding and trust between men and women,
and between prospective spouses. Recall that 37% percent of
black women aged eighteen to twenty-four are raising chil-
dren, while only 5% of black men are living with their own
children.
Meanwhile, as marriage seems less and less permanent
and appears to offer fewer and fewer advantages to young
people, unmarried childbearing has lost much of its stigma.24
The increase in unmarried childbearing has occurred among
all racial and ethnic groups, and at all ages. Moreover, it is
common to all industrialized and industrializing nations. In-
deed, unmarried childbearing is even more common in sev-
eral European nations than in the United States, and is asso-
ciated with the growth in women's economic and social
independence as well as the concomitant decline in marriage
that are widely shared international trends.
III. PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES
The substantial gender gap in the child rearing behavior
of young Americans, along with the high poverty rates among
families with children, has drawn attention to policies gov-
erning AFDC. On the one hand, men are seen as getting
away without supporting the children they helped conceive.
On the other hand, women are seen as able to live off the
state instead of getting married. Although recent and pro-
posed changes in the laws governing these two policy areas
are often advocated as ways to stem the increase in mother-
child families, these claims may be nothing more than vain
23. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Teenage Childbearing Reconsidered, in KIDS
HAVING KIDS: THE CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS OF TEENAGE CHILDBEARING IN
THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 1996).
24. Deanna L. Pagnini & Ronald R. Rinfuss, The Divorce of Marriage and
Childbearing: Changing Attitudes and Behavior in the United States, 19 Popu-
LATION & DEV. REV. 331, 331-47 (1993).
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hopes. In the following section, we analyze some current pol-
icy initiatives with an eye to their likely consequences for
children, and their possible impacts on adult behavior, partic-
ularly as they pertain to the household structure.
A. The AFDC Program
AFDC is often cited as the most important, or even the
sole, cause of the increase in female headship. The program
provides cash benefits to low-income, primarily single par-
ents with children. Because very little public aid exists for
adults without children, and because AFDC is much less
readily available to two-parent than one-parent families, the
program is widely believed to encourage divorce and
nonmarital childbearing.25 Consequently, reforming welfare
has become a central policy issue for both Democrats and
Republicans.
The evidence supporting the claim that welfare caused
the increase in mother-child families is not strong. Although
some recent studies have found modest but statistically sig-
nificant increases in unwed childbearing or divorce among
certain groups of women associated with higher levels of
AFDC payments,26 the majority of studies have found no ef-
fects at all of AFDC on family formation behavior.2 7 The cor-
relational evidence tends to run in the wrong direction. The
growth in one-parent families accompanied a decline, not
growth, in average AFDC payments per family for the last
25. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984).
26. See David Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, The Impact of AFDC on Family
Structure and Living Arrangements, 7 RES. LAB. ECON. 137, 137-208 (Richard
Ehrenberg ed., 1985); Robert Moffitt, The Effect of the U.S. Welfare System on
Marital Status, 41 J. PUB. ECON. 101, 101-24 (1990); Robert Plotnick, Welfare
and Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing: Evidence from the 1980s, 52 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 735, 735-46 (1990).
27. Lyle Groeneveld et al., Final Report of the Seattle Denver Income Main-
tenance Experiment, in 1 DESIGN & RESULTS (1983).
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two decades.2" Unmarried birth rates tend to be highest in
the states that have the lowest AFDC grants. Moreover, the
fraction of one-parent families utilizing AFDC has not been
rising.
The conclusion reached by Hilary Williamson Hoynes in
1994 from a study of twenty years of longitudinal data is typi-
cal of many studies. 29 "This study clearly shows that there is
no evidence [in the data considered] that AFDC benefits play
any role in female headship decisions."30 Among scholars
who have found AFDC to play a role, none have suggested
that those effects could account for more than a small fraction
of the overall growth in divorces and out-of-wedlock births.
Nevertheless, both Democratic and Republican politi-
cians now seem to believe that only a complete overhaul of
the program will stem the growth of out-of-wedlock childbear-
ing. Republicans are proposing many changes to AFDC, of
which I will focus on only two: (1) providing federal financial
support to the states in the form of block grants, rather than
as a subsidy based on the number of AFDC cases served by
the state; and, (2) making children born to unmarried women
under eighteen permanently ineligible for AFDC.
The proposal to shift the federal component of AFDC
financing from an open-ended entitlement basis to a set of
capped block grants to individual states should be viewed
against a demographic backdrop. A state's AFDC caseload is
a function of the number of children living in the state, espe-
cially the number of young children since families tend to use
AFDC when their children are very young. The number of
young children varies with the number of women in their
prime childbearing years, usually their twenties. Other im-
28. TABLE 4
AVERAGE MONTHLY AFDC
BENEFIT PER FAMILY (IN BIRTHS PER 1,000







Ratio: 1992 : 1970 0.59 1.78
29. Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Does Welfare Play Any Role in Female
Headship Decisions? (1995) (unpublished paper, on file with Department of Ec-
onomics, University of California, Berkeley).
30. Id.
338 [Vol. 36
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portant factors are the proportion of families that are one-
parent families, which is itself a function of the age and eth-
nic composition of the state's population, and the strength of
the state's economy.
These demographic and economic factors influencing the
size of the AFDC caseload can shift quite sharply over time
and differentially among states. States in which the popula-
tion of young adults is growing will have more and more new
families and additional children every year, thus enabling
more people to be eligible for AFDC. A funding formula that
is tied to the state's past AFDC caseload will not be respon-
sive to the growth in the number of children.
In a sharp break with the past, block grants will not pro-
vide a state's AFDC program with the necessary federal
funds to expand with demographic trends, or with local un-
employment rates. California's recent history offers a fine ex-
ample of both problems. California saw its AFDC rolls grow
sharply between 1990 and 1992. This was a consequence of
the large number of women in their late teens and twenties
living in the state, the resulting large number of births, and
the statewide recession that pushed many parents out of the
work force and into temporary dependency on AFDC."
A block grant system would not have provided the kind of
flexibility California needed to respond to those demographic
and economic circumstances. The demographic and economic
trends that propel families onto AFDC are not under the di-
rect or even indirect control of individual state governments.
Yet these are the proximate factors driving the AFDC
caseload. If these factors change so as to generate higher
AFDC caseloads, states will have to manipulate other policy
tools, such as the level of the grant or the eligibility criteria
for the program, in order to bring expenditures back into line.
The proposal to deny aid to babies born to unmarried mi-
nors is intended to reduce the AFDC caseload by making
some children ineligible for the program. It is also intended
to reduce poverty in the long run by discouraging those wo-
men who are clearly unable to support a family from having
children. It is part of a broader agenda to discourage unmar-
ried births by cutting off financial aid to these babies.
31. California had the third highest rate of births per 1000 persons in the
nation in 1990-1992, exceeded only by Alaska and Utah. It also had the third
highest unemployment rate.
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Examining the last point first, this proposal will have
only a small impact on the overall unmarried birth rate, since
nearly ninety percent of nonmarital births are to women aged
eighteen and over. Even though the number of children offi-
cially supported by AFDC grants may fall to some extent, the
number of AFDC cases and expenditures are not likely to
shrink appreciably for the following reasons.
In 1992, there were 160,000 births to unmarried girls
under eighteen. We assume that between 60% and 80% of
these mothers are on AFDC during the baby's first year, so
these infants account for between one-sixth and one-quarter
of all infants on AFDC. If these children make up a roughly
constant fraction of AFDC recipients as they age, we may as-
sume that eventually one-fifth of all children who otherwise
would receive AFDC will be ineligible under this "exclusion of
minors" rule.
However, the number of families and the volume of ex-
penditures on the program will not shrink by as much as one-
fifth. Data from the Current Population Survey indicates
that only about one-fifth of minor parents on AFDC live on
their own as heads of their own AFDC cases. 2 The remain-
ing four-fifths live with their parents, who are almost always
themselves recipients of AFDC grants. In the past, a young
mother's new baby has been included in the grandparent's
AFDC grant. However, under the new policy, this will not be
the case. The new policy will prevent only a few new AFDC
cases from being opened, perhaps only four percent fewer
than in the past. The main effect of the proposal will be to
compel older women already on AFDC to care for a new
grandchild without an increase in their grants.
Because the fiscal impact of the minor-exclusion rule will
typically be felt by the young mother's own mother and by the
family as a whole, rather than by the young woman alone, its
deterrent effect on childbearing is likely to be weak. As we
have already seen, the steady drop in the value of the AFDC
grant has not discouraged unmarried childbearing among
teens or older women in the past. In effect, this new policy
32. Cara Lesser, Can They Go Home Again? Requiring Minor Parents to
Live at Home Is Unlikely to Reduce Welfare Dependency (1994) (unpublished
paper prepared for U.S. General Accounting Office, on file with the Graduate
School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley).
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simply ratchets the grant down another notch, forcing fami-
lies to cope as they have done in the past.
Once the young mother turns eighteen, her situation
changes in two ways. First, she is no longer eligible for
AFDC on her mother's grant or will no longer be once she
turns nineteen, depending on her state of residence and her
educational status. More importantly, only if she has an-
other baby will she become eligible to head her own AFDC
case. Thus, one result of this policy may be to encourage a
young unwed mother to have a second child as quickly as pos-
sible after her eighteenth birthday. A birth at that point enti-
tles her to a welfare grant which is intended for a family with
one child rather than two.
We have considered only two elements in the Republi-
cans' proposals to revamp welfare. In essence, these propos-
als would manipulate the program to lower the grants across
the board or for certain types of families. Other proposals,
such as the two year limit, would involve removing large
numbers of people from the program. These policies are un-
likely to have more than a marginal impact on the rate of
unmarried childbearing. It is hard to see why they would en-
courage marriage, given that past cuts have been associated
with fewer marriages.
Indisputably, these proposals would inflict harm on chil-
dren, with the extent of the harm commensurate with the
magnitude of the cuts. There is abundant evidence that pov-
erty is bad for children and severe or long-term poverty is
even worse for them. Poor children are much more likely
than affluent children to grow up malnourished, developmen-
tally impaired, unhappy, in poor physical and mental health,
under-educated, and ultimately under-employed or unem-
ployable. AFDC is a safety net that does not lift recipients
out of poverty but keeps them from complete destitution.
Every AFDC cut causes recipients to fall deeper into poverty
and pushes some families into homelessness or other kinds of
severe hardship.
If we, as a society, want children to grow up with suffi-
cient human and material resources, policies must be
adopted that make marriage economically and socially viable
for disadvantaged young parents. Many of the strategies that
would be good for children could also encourage marriage or
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discourage nonmarital childbearing. It is to these policies
that we now turn.
B. Policies to Support Young Parents
A focused strategy is needed to improve the lives of the
fifty percent of young people who do not attend college. Col-
lege attendance offers young people many advantages apart
from education and increased earning potential. As long as
they are still students, young people receive shelter and an
extension of the protection and counsel provided by parents.
Most college teachers are very conscious of their dual roles as
scholars and as mentors. Students who flounder and fail typ-
ically get second chances, and the institution offers various
sorts of assistance to help them get back on track and suc-
cessfully complete their education.
Young people who do not attend college have no such in-
stitutionalized safe havens in which to mature. Rather, they
face an exceptionally brutal job market, which is far less open
and forgiving than the job market facing better-educated peo-
ple. Within this harsh environment, any physical, emotional,
or mental setbacks, such as the depression, uncertainty, irre-
sponsibility, and impulsiveness often displayed by adoles-
cents, can have serious consequences. Thus, while better em-
ployment, education, and training programs are obviously
needed for noncollege-bound youth, so too are a range of other
buffers and assistance. In particular, we should invest in
drug and alcohol treatment programs which have been found
to pay off fiscally. Additionally, recreational and mentoring
programs for people in their late teens and early twenties
should be instituted.
Drug and alcohol problems can seriously interfere with
employment and family life among young adults. Colleges
and universities try to deal with these problems among their
students. Middle-class parents also have access to resources
in order to address such problems. Similar resources should
be directed to less advantaged youth.
Finally, reproductive health services explicitly designed
for young men and women are essential. They are necessary
not only to prevent unwanted pregnancies, which are at epi-
demic proportions, but also to stem the equally troubling epi-
demic of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly AIDS,
among young adults. These investments in the skills, educa-
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tion, and health of young adults will be costly, but so is
higher education. Billions of public dollars flow into our uni-
versities and colleges every year.
We also need to expand systems of income support that
can support two-parent as well as one-parent families in pov-
erty. Chief among these is the Earned Income Tax Credit, a
subsidy to working parents. A refundable tax credit, perhaps
one scaled to family income so that lower-income families
receive a larger credit, would also direct resources toward
two-parent as well as one-parent families with children. For
two-parent families with low or no earnings, however, AFDC
should be as readily available as it is to one-parent families.
Under current law, a couple with low earnings will not re-
ceive much assistance from the Earned Income Tax Credit
and will be ineligible for AFDC if the primary worker works
more than 100 hours in a month, no matter how low the par-
ents' earnings. These rules should be changed.
If low-income families are to escape poverty through em-
ployment, subsidized and high quality child care must be-
come widely available. At present, the people at the top of
the priority list for this highly coveted public benefit are wo-
men who have recently left AFDC for a job or are combining
AFDC and employment after having been on welfare for quite
a long time.
The supply of public dollars for this service falls far short
of the demand, and consequently, many women who would
want to work cannot do so. In particular, two-parent families
find it much harder to qualify for subsidized services than do
one-parent families.
Child support policies also need reform. If young men be-
came convinced that they would have to pay child support for
every child they conceived, some might become more inter-
ested in preventing unplanned pregnancies. The reforms in-
stituted under the 1988 Family Support Act were intended to
increase the number of child support awards, particularly for
unmarried mothers, to reduce judicial discretion in setting
the levels of awards, and to increase collections. The next set
of changes should focus on reducing the considerable varia-
tion among states in award levels, particularly the payments
expected from low-income fathers. These policies should per-
mit mothers on AFDC to receive a larger fraction of the child
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support payment.3 3 They should also develop better strate-
gies to deal with the difficulties facing low-earning men in
arrears for large amounts of child support.
In sum, what is needed is a comprehensive strategy to
improve the lives of low-income young adults with a special
focus on reproductive health, mental health, and substance
abuse services. We need to implement changes in our means-
tested programs for employment assistance, income supple-
mentation, and child care that would make marriage look like
a viable economic solution for these young adults. Finally,
child support laws must be changed to impose fair, managea-
ble, and unavoidable payments on noncustodial fathers.
33. Currently, the welfare program claims the entire child support payment
from the father except for $50 a month, an amount that has not changed in 12
years.
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